Justice Tobriner and Real Property by Adler, Jonathan R. & Mosk, Richard M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 6
1-1977
Justice Tobriner and Real Property
Jonathan R. Adler
Richard M. Mosk
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jonathan R. Adler and Richard M. Mosk, Justice Tobriner and Real Property, 29 Hastings L.J. 127 (1977).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol29/iss1/6
Justice Tobriner and Real Property
By JoNATHAN R. ADLER*
RICHMM M. MosK**
Professor Casner, observing that "[p]roperty law is not noted for
its rapidity of change,"' has reported that "Lord Mansfield in the
eighteenth century undertook to loosen up the old [property] rules
in the name of practicality and common sense ... *"2 According
to Casner, one of Mansfield's contemporaries rebuked those efforts
by declaring:
"'Instead of these certain positive rules by which the judgments
of a court of law should invariably be determined, you [Lord
Mansfield] have fondly introduced your own unsettled notions of
equity and substantial justice.... By such treacherous arts the
noble simplicity and free spirit of our Saxon laws were first
corrupted.' -
Examining traditional doctrine in light of new social and economic
realities has been the hallmark of Justice Mathew 0. Tobriner's hous-
ing, zoning, and other real property law opinions. In reaching deci-
sions, he has never feared to rely upon his own "notions of equity and
substantial justice" in order to accommodate what he perceived to
be economic imbalances of power and choice in society. By those
"treacherous arts" he has helped to make traditional doctrines of "noble
simplicity" more responsive to the needs of our times.
Justice Tobriner has, in fact, shown relatively little reverence for
traditional real property doctrines. He has written that the time has
passed "when property rights were exalted over our citizens' rights
in life or liberty."4
* B.A., 1961, Harvard College; LL.B., 1966, Yale Law School. Member, New
York and California Bars.
** A.B., 1960, Stanford University; J.D., 1963, Harvard Law School. Member,
California Bar.
1. A. Casner, Property, in AmPcAN LAw: THE THD CENTURy 131 (1976).
2. Id.
3. Id. (quoting J. CAmBELL, 3 THE LIvEs OF THE CHmF JUSTiCES OF ENCLM.m
337 (7th ed. 1878)).
4. San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 213, 529
P.2d 570, 575, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 151 (1974).
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His concern that the law reflect policies of economic fairness, rea-
sonable consumer expectations, and equitable loss distribution unifies
his opinions in real property. Those policies have not always dictated
a clear result, especially in cases of closely competing interests. Never-
theless, Justice Tobriner has made the effort to illuminate the judicial
application of traditional rules with a penetrating analysis of modern
conditions. This Article, therefore, considers some of Justice To-
briner's observations about the social and economic conditions of our
times before exploring the impact of these observations upon his
property decisions.
General, Social, and Economic Philosophy
Many of the themes Justice Tobriner developed more fully in
later writings first emerged from a short essay he wrote several months
after taking the bench of the district court of appeal on April 14, 1959.5
In that article he wrote of the vanishing myth of laissez faire free
economic choice and noted that the rise of a fully industrialized and
urban economy, based upon large institutional power blocks, has dis-
placed the individual as the prime economic decisionmaker.6 He
described his perception of present day socioeconomic conditions:
We are in an exciting perod in the growth of [the common]
law. The somewhat terrifying and basic changes in the organi-
zation of our society insist upon new definition. Obviously the
social order, which, only a half-century ago, rested upon an agri-
cultural economy, in which the individual's freedom of action
was a chief characteristic, has become an urban and industrial
society in which group action has become the principal form or
organization.
We see in modern society the development of potent power
blocks, such as the unions, industrial management..., agriculture,
the public utilities and other such special interests. In many in-
stances these private groups exercise governmental power.
7
He suggested that the law must respond to these realities by effec-
tuating a "new individualism" - a new notion of economic "status"
or "relationship" - based on procedural safeguards and substantive
common law rights as a means of offsetting economic and power
imbalances.8
It is perhaps easy to mistake Justice Tobriner's inclination toward
5. See Tobriner, Justice Tobriner Ponders Rights of Individual in Changing So-
ciety, 9 THE BRIEF CASE 13 (Nov. 1959).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 41.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
September 19771 JUSTICE TOBRINER AND REAL PROPERTY
new doctrine based on status or relationship as a quest for simplified
or rigid rules of law analogous to those of the early common law. He
did not, however, seek a new rigidity; to the contrary, he advocated
a flexible and innovative use of concepts of economic status and rela-
tionship to break down rigid, monolithic rules in real property, con-
tracts, and torts. He concluded that the common law responds to
challenges of modem, organized society by restructuring its principles
to impose duties and obligations in light of new economic concepts. 9
Justice Tobriner explained his idea of the role of the courts in
such legal reform in a response to Chief Justice Burger's widely quoted
remark advising young people against going into law for the purpose
of reforming society.'0 Justice Tobriner observed that Chief Justice
Burger's position rested on the premise that the reforms that the young
were seeking could only be achieved by revolutionary legislative
programs." Justice Tobriner felt otherwise:
[A] major part of [the] dissatisfaction of the young stems not so
much from a disagreement with the basic principles of our insti-
tutions, but rather with the failure of the society uniformly to
adhere to those principles, a failure to afford existing legal rights
equally to all members of society - poor, as well as rich, black,
brown and yellow, as well as white, female as well as male, the
individual consumer as well as the corporate producer.1
2
As additional examples of society's failure at uniform application of
basic legal principles, he cited the economically disinherited, students,
tenants in public housing projects, and "the most forlorn and forgot-
ten class of all," prisoners faced with parole revocation or disciplinary
isolation. 13
Must reform for classes such as these await legislative action as
Chief Justice Burger argued? Justice Tobriner thought not:
[C]ourts are capable of creative judicial response to pressures
for readjustment of societal relationships, and . . . reform of so-
ciety need not be confined to legislative halls. In recent years the
judicial system has proven itself capable of grasping the significant
movements that have changed the complexion of our culture, and
of shaping legal relationships to accommodate new social patterns
and to preserve cherished freedoms. In the near future there will
be, if anything, an increasing need that the demands for social
9. Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the
New Industrial State, 55 CALuF. L. REv. 1247, 1248-49 (1967).
10. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1971, § 1, at 20, col. 1.
11. 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 294, 296 (1972).
12. Id.
13. Id.
reform - and even social 'revolution' - be pressed in the judicial
sphere and framed in the context of legal relationships.
[T]he genius of our judicial system lies in its capacity to func-
tion as an alternative, complementary institution in reformulating
the framework of society's rules to achieve newly-embraced values
and goals.14
True to his convictions, Justice Tobriner in his opinions in the
area of real property law reflects both a sensitivity for modem economic
realities and a belief in the capacity of the judicial system to provide
a fair and timely response.
Housing - The Tenant's Right to Habitable and
Safe Premises
Green v. Superior Court
Justice Tobriner's philosophy is well represented in what is per-
haps his most significant landlord-tenant opinion, Green v. Superior
Court.15 Green was not the first case, in either California or other
jurisdictions, to recognize an implied dependent covenant of habita-
bility in residential housing. 16 It was, however, the California Su-
preme Court's first expression of that principle, and it remains one
of the most careful explanations that any court has given for the new
doctrine. It exemplifies Justice Tobriner's faith in the capability of
courts to adjust traditional doctrine to new economic realities and
thereby to keep the law in harmony with social change.
Green's defense in small claims court to an unlawful detainer
action seeking possession of his apartment and $300 in back rent was
that the landlord had failed to maintain the premises in a habitable
condition. At the de novo trial on appeal, Green submitted an in-
spection report by the Department of Public Works that listed eighty
housing code violations in the building and an order scheduling a
condemnation hearing. Among the alleged defects, Green listed a
collapsed bathroom ceiling, the presence of rats, mice, and cockroaches,
lack of heat in four rooms of the apartment, plumbing blockages, ex-
14. Id. at 298.
15. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 517 P.2d 1168, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1974). Interestingly,
Justice Tobriner's first appearance in the California Supreme Court Reports was as a
litigant-landlord. Colyear v. Tobriner, 7 Cal. 2d 735, 62 P.2d 741 (1936).
16. See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 924 (1970); Hinson v. Delis, 26 Cal. App. 3d 62, 102 Cal. Rptr.
661 (1972); Lemle v. Breeden, 51 Haw. 426, 462 P.2d 470 (1969); Reste Realty Corp.
v. Cooper, 53 N.J. 444, 251 A.2d 268 (1969); Pines v. Perssion, 14 Wis. 2d 590, 111
N.W.2d 409 (1961).
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posed and faulty wiring, and a dangerous and illegally installed stove.
The superior court agreed with the landlord's position that the "repair
and deduct" provisions of the California Civil Code"' provided the
tenant's exclusive remedy, and it awarded the landlord possession and
three-quarters of the rent he sought. The California Supreme Court,
in directing the Superior Court to proceed with the trial of the unlaw-
ful detainer action, held that the assertion by Green of the landlord's
breach of the implied warranty of habitability was a valid defense to
an unlawful detainer action for nonpayment of rent.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Tobriner pointed out that
the development of the doctrine of constructive eviction indicated
that repair and deduct statutes were not designed to displace the
common law which established the respective rights of landlords and
tenants.18 Under the doctrine of constructive eviction a tenant may
abandon the premises without further liability whenever the acts or
omissions of the landlord render the premises unfit for the purposes
for which they were leased.19 In Green, however, the court was con-
fronted with a repair and deduct statute that limited the remedy of the
tenant to the utilization of one month's rent for immediate repairs.
20
The conflict was resolved by interpreting the statute in light of the
realities of the tenant's economic position:
[T]he limited nature of the "repair and deduce' remedy, in
itself, suggests that it was not designed to serve as an exclusive
remedy for tenants in this area .... These limitations [of fre-
quency and amount of deductions] demonstrate that the Leg-
islature framed the section only to encompass relatively minor
dilapidations in leased premises. As the facts of the instant case
reveal, in the most serious instances of deterioration, when the
costs of repair are at all significant, section 1942 does not provide,
and could not have been designed as, a viable solution.21
In a footnote, Justice Tobriner cited the compelling rhetorical
question asked by a New Jersey court regarding the options of a
tenant asserting defects in his multi-story apartment building's heating
system, plumbing, elevators, and incinerator: "Was the tenant re-
quired to make the repairs to this 400-unit complex as a prerequisite
to the availability of the relief ... ? If the answer to that question
17. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 1941-42 (West 1970).
18. 10 Cal. 3d at 630, 517 P.2d at 1177, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713.
19. Id.
20. CAL. Civ. CODE § 1942(a) (West 1970).
21. 10 Cal. 3d at 630-31, 517 P.2d at 1177-78, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 713-14 (cita-
tions omitted). See Note, The Great Green Hope: The Implied Warranty of Habit-
ability in Practice, 28 STAN. L. REv. 729 (1976).
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is in the affirmative, [repair and deduct relief] has no meaning to
tenants in multi-family dwellings who need the relief most."
22
Such an eminently sensible answer to the question of the exclu-
sivity of the repair and deduct remedy might leave advocates of ju-
dicial restraint intellectually unsatisfied. They might ask, for example,
could not the legislature in its one month rent limitation have been
implementing valid policies, such as preventing tenants from taking
undue advantage of landlords or recognizing the difficulty of evaluat-
ing the monetary loss owing to partial constructive evictions. The
force of Justice Tobriner's economic analysis supporting the recogni-
tion of a dependent covenant of habitability precluded a different
result on the repair and deduct issue.
To emphasize the impact of modern economic conditions on
landlord-tenant relationships, Justice Tobriner recalled that the tra-
ditional doctrine of the independence of the covenant to pay rent
had its origins in a body of real property common law that arose
separately from contract law. Under those old common law rules a
landlord had a duty neither to place premises in a habitable condition
nor to repair them. Those rules, the Justice said, were well suited
to the agrarianism of the early Middle Ages.2 3 The economic realities
of urban housing, however, stand in marked contrast to the agrarian
model:
First, the increasing complexity of modern apartment build-
ings not only renders them much more difficult and expensive
to repair than the living quarters of earlier days, but also makes
adequate inspection of the premises by a prospective tenant a
virtual impossibility; . . . the landlord, who has had experience
with the building, is certainly in a much better position to discover
and to cure dilapidations in the premises....
Second, unlike the multi-skilled lessee of old, today's city
dweller generally has a single, specialized skill unrelated to main-
tenance work. Furthermore, . . . a tenant's limited tenure in a
specific apartment will frequently not justify efforts at extensive
repairs. Finally, the expense of needed repairs will often be out-
side the reach of many tenants .... 24
Justice Tobriner concluded his analysis of the differences between
the contemporary urban setting and the agrarian basis for traditional
common law doctrine by considering the effect of these economic
realities upon tenant remedies. He concluded that the few common
22. 10 Cal. 3d at 631 n.15, 517 P.2d at 1178, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 714 (quoting
Academy Spires, Inc. v. Brown, 111 N.J. Super. 477, 268 A.2d 556 (1970)).
23. 10 Cal. 3d at 622-23, 517 P.2d at 1172, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 708.
24. Id. at 625, 517 P.2d at 1173-74, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 709-10.
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law remedies theretofore available had been rendered inadequate to
ameliorate the consequences of the "no duty to repair" rule. He cited,
for example, the inadequacy of the doctrine of constructive eviction as
a remedy for the typical low income tenant. In order to avail himself
of the doctrine, the tenant must vacate the premises; yet in the present
housing market, many tenants are unable to find alternative housing
that they can afford.
25
Justice Tobriner also drew compelling analogies from develop-
ments in other areas of consumer law:
In most significant respects, the modem urban tenant is in the
same position as any other normal consumer of goods. Through
a residential lease, a tenant seeks to purchase "housing." ...
The landlord "sells" housing .... A tenant may reasonably ex-
pect that the product he is purchasing is fit for the purpose for
which it is obtained, that is, a living unit .... It is just such
reasonable expectations of consumers which the modern "implied
warranty" decisions endow with formal, legal protection.2 6
It may be more a tribute to Justice Tobriner's persuasiveness than
a comment on the case to observe that his decision in Green seems to
have been irresistably compelled by the force of his views on the role
of courts in the face of social change. Nonetheless, the Green case did
bring together many of the strands of Justice Tobriner's economic,
social, and jurisprudential views, his analysis of the historical and
modem bases of legal doctrine, his attention to the balance of eco-
nomic power, his respect for legitimate consumer expectations, his
sensitivity to the unequal ability of the parties to cure defects, and his
understanding of the problems of the poor.
Hanson v. Luft
Much earlier in his judicial career Justice Tobriner, as a district
court of appeal justice, noted the evolutionary development of land-
lord liability for certain dangers to tenants.2 7  In Hanson v. Luft, 28
plaintiff, the five-year old daughter of a tenant, sued the landlord for
injuries she received from an open flame heater in the living room of
the rented premises. The plaintiff alleged that the heater was dan-
gerous, especially to a child, and that the landlord knew that the
heater had burned a child of a previous tenant. The trial court sus-
25. Id. at 625 n.10, 517 P.2d at 1174, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
26. Id. at 627, 517 P.2d at 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 711 (citations omitted).
27. Hanson v. Luft, 22 Cal. Rptr. 48, 54 (Dist. Ct. App.), vacated, 58 Cal. 2d
443, 374 P.2d 641, 24 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1962).
28. Id.
tained the landlord's demurrer without leave to amend. Writing for
the court of appeal, Justice Tobriner concluded that the trial court's
decision that the plaintiff could not state a cause of action as a matter
of law should be reversed. He reasoned that a jury or trial court
could have found that the danger to the child occupant was sufficiently
latent so that the landlord had a duty to warn the tenant of danger.
The Supreme Court of California granted a hearing in the case and,
after Justice Tobriner's elevation to that court, unanimously affirmed
the trial court's decision 29 by concluding that the danger of the open
and unguarded heater was so obvious to the parents that the landlord
had no duty to warn. The court found that the duty of protecting
children from such dangers rests with parents who choose to become
tenants of obviously dangerous premises.30
Although Justice Tobriner had stated in his appellate opinion that
there was a question of fact whether the risk of the heater was latent,
the supreme court said that the risk was clear as a matter of "common
knowledge." 31 Justice Tobriner in dicta in his district court of appeal
opinion had suggested the possibility of liability if the risk were hidden
from the child but evident to the tenant parents. The supreme court,
however, foreclosed the possibility of such liability in Hanson.
As in other areas of the law, Justice Tobriner in his opinion con-
sidered the status of the parties and their relative economic positions.
Thus, he concluded:
In the words of Prosser, "There is increasing recognition of the
fact that the tenant who leases defective premises is likely to be im-
pecunious and unable to make the necessary repairs, and that the
financial burden is best placed upon the landlord who receives a
a benefit from the transaction .... ." It would be incongruous
to hold that the landlord, who knows of the dangerous propensities
of a heater to an expected child occupant of the leased premises,
a risk not necessarily realized by the tenant himself, may escape
into silence and may permit the exposure of the child to risk
without so much as a warning. To condone such silence would
be to disregard the evolving development in this field of law of
the responsibility of the landlord for such dangers.
3 2
29. Although the supreme court decided this case after his elevation to the court,
Justice Tobriner was replaced on the court for this case by his predecessor, Justice
Dooling.
30. 58 Cal. 2d at 446-47, 374 P.2d at 643, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 683. Cases have
noted that "'patent' in the test of duty to warn refers to the patency of danger and
not merely to exterior visibility ...... Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 558, 375 P.2d
304, 307, 25 Cal. Rtpr. 456, 459 (1962); Halliday v. Greene, 244 Cal. App. 2d 482,
487, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267, 271 (1966).
31. 58 Cal. 2d at 446, 374 P.2d at 643, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 683.
32. 22 Cal. Rptr. at 54 (quoting PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 465-66 (citation
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Zoning -The Community's Right to Plan Effectively
Justice Tobriner's concern for adequate housing extends beyond
habitability and safety to effective planning and zoning. The interests
of the "powerless" or of the "consumer" do not, however, appear so
clearly in zoning cases. In such cases one cannot easily determine
where equity and fairness in economic power and reasonable expec-
tations lie. Justice Tobriner seems to recognize the importance of
planning, zoning, and variance decisions in helping to determine the
quality of life for the community of housing consumers. Only the
most harsh and arbitrary application of zoning provisions will deflect
Justice Tobriner from his course of defending the community's right
to plan and zone for its own long range interests, even at the expense
of the individual landowner.
Claim of Vested Right to Build
In 1967 Justice Tobriner wrote two opinions involving important
quasi-procedural issues that helped to protect the integrity of the zon-
ing process. The first was Russian Hill Improvement Association v.
Board of Permit Appeals,3 3 which raised the question of when a build-
ing permit became lawfully granted within the meaning of the San
Francisco City Planning Code and, therefore, immune from revocation
by virtue of a later change in the zoning laws. 34 Specifically, the case
determined the nature of the role of the Board of Permit Appeals in
the permit process and the law to be applied by the board when con-
sidering a permit request. At stake was the ability of a developer to
rely on a last minute permit obtained in the face of impending changes
in zoning and the ability of a municipality to plan and zone in an
orderly, effective manner.
For a unanimous court, Justice Tobriner held that a permit was
omitted). This case also exemplifies Justice Tobriner's general reluctance to permit
judges to replace juries in deciding whether a defendant breached a duty of care.
See, e.g., Justice Tobriner's opinion in Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Ltd., 67 Cal. 2d 232,
430 P.2d 68, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1967).
33. 66 Cal. 2d 34, 423 P.2d 824, 56 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1967).
34. See id. at 36 n.1, 423 P.2d at 826, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 674. San Francisco City
Planning Code § 150(d) states "Any building or use for which a permit has been
lawfully granted prior to the effective date of -an amendment to the City Planning
Code, where such date is subsequent to May 2, 1960, may be completed and used in
accordance with the approved plans, provided that construction is started and diligently
prosecuted to completion in accordance with Section 304 of the Building Code, and
such building or use shall thereafter be deemed to be a lawfully existing building or
use." Amended Ord. 200-60, approved April 21, 1960.
lawfully granted and, hence, immune from changes in the law only
after "all administrative action regarding the permit application has
been completed ....- 35 Until either the lapse of the time for appeal
or final action by the Board of Permit Appeals, no vested rights inured
in a permit issued by the Central Permit Bureau. The permit could
be revoked if changes in the zoning laws making construction pursuant
to the permit unlawful became effective during either period of time.
In reaching this decision, Justice Tobriner stated first that the Board
of Permit Appeals reviewed applications for permits de novo and
second that, as a matter of settled administrative law, it was bound to
apply the zoning laws in effect at the time of its decision. The result
that followed in the case at hand was affirmance of the trial court's
grant of a writ of mandate ordering the board to revoke a building
permit that authorized construction of a building in excess of the
height limitations of the current zoning law. The -permit had been
issued by the permit bureau four days before the effective date of the
new height limitation ordinance, and the plaintiffs had filed a timely
appeal of that action to the board. In denying their appeal, the board
erred by failing to consider the developer's permit application in light
of the new ordinance.
Justice Tobriner noted that California's common law rule of vested
rights allowed for revocation of a building permit on the basis of a
subsequent change in the zoning laws unless the developer had con-
structed a substantial portion of the structure in good faith reliance
upon his permit. That rule created the incongruous situation:
A permittee who delayed construction in the face of an impending
amendment to the zoning laws might find that he had not pro-
gressed far enough in time to qualify for immunity; one who pro-
ceeded with unseemingly [sic] haste ran the risk that his conduct
might bear the stigma of bad faith. No facile formula informed
the permittee how to strike the delicate balance which would
afford the desired immunity.3-
According to Justice Tobriner the purpose of San Francisco's stat-
utory provision for the determination of a developer's vested rights was
to avoid this dilemma and the uncertainty that it evoked. It estab-
lished a definite date based upon a specific municipal act - lawful
granting of a permit - as the point at which a developer was conferred
a fixed right to proceed with construction regardless of later changes
in the law. Any ability on the part of the Board of Permit Appeals to
exercise discretion as to the law to be applied during the permit process
35. 66 Cal. 2d at 45-46, 423 P.2d at 833, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 681.
36. Id. at 39, 423 P.2d at 829, 56 Cal. Rptr. at 677 (citations omitted).
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would only serve to defeat this purpose by creating new uncertainties.
Thus, it was bound to apply the law in effect at the time of its decision.
The effect of Justice Tobriner's decision in Russian Hill was two-
fold. It deterred last minute efforts by developers to avoid the effect
of changes in the zoning laws, and it furthered planning policy that
disfavored the proliferation of non-conforming uses. A municipality
could henceforth consider and enact zoning laws confident that its
planning efforts would not be thwarted by developer's eleventh hour
efforts to create "vested" construction rights.
Variances Based on a "Right to Profits"
Broadway, Laguna, Vallejo Association v. Board of Permit Ap-
peals37 raised the question whether a reduction of anticipated profits
to a developer was a valid "exceptional or extraordinary" circumstance
justifying the Board of Permit Appeals' grant of a variance from floor
area ratio restrictions. In Broadway, Laguna Justice Tobriner's ma-
jority opinion holding the variance invalid protected an important
zoning tool. The court's decision required the developer to remove
one story of a completed eleven story, fifty-three unit apartment build-
ing and to convert two apartments on lower floors to utility purposes.
The purported exceptional circumstances upon which the Board
of Permit Appeals relied in granting the variance included the de-
veloper's belated discovery that subsoil conditions would require extra
expense for foundations and thus higher fixed costs and lower profits
than anticipated, the building's alleged attractiveness, and its over
compliance with other planning code limitations such as height, lot
coverage, parking space, and number of dwelling units. Justice To-
briner held, however, that the Board's findings did not support the
variance from floor ratio restrictions. He began by pointing out the
crucial role of floor area ratio restrictions in community planning:
The variance requested by the developer . . . did not in-
volve a relatively unimportant code provision. On the contrary,
the consensus among zoning authorities is that, in terms of con-
trolling population density and structural congestion, the tech-
nique of restricting the ratio of a building's rentable floor space
to the size of the lot on which it is constructed possesses numerous
advantages, both theoretical and practical, shared by no other
method of controlling building bulk or density.8
In a subsequent footnote, Justice Tobriner explained the inadequacy
37. 66 Cal. 2d 767, 427 P.2d 810, 59 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1967).
38. Id. at 771, 427 P.2d at 813, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 149.
of other planning tools for controlling bulk and density, with reference
to important goals of housing policy:
It has been noted, for example, that restrictions upon the number
of dwelling units per unit of land area encourage building for
large or affluent families to the exclusion of quarters for individ-
uals, couples, or families with small means. Floor area ratio reg-
ulations, on the other hand, are advantageous in that they permit
the construction of smaller and less expensive apartment units.
39
The importance of consistent enforcement of planning code re-
strictions, Justice Tobriner wrote, could not yield to the developer's
interest in maximizing profits:
We recognize that virtually any circumstance which would
lead a commercial real estate developer to seek a variance may
ultimately be translated into economic terms: the developer at-
tempts to obtain relief from a particular zoning provision in order
to augment the earning power or the market value.of his property.
. . . If conditions which merely reduce profit margin were
deemed sufficiently 'exceptional' to warrant relief from the zoning
laws, then all but the least imaginative developers could obtain
a variety of variances, and the 'public interest in the enforcement
of a comprehensive zoning plan' would inevitably yield to the
private interest in the maximization of profits.
• .. The board made no finding in this case that the de-
veloper could not earn a reasonable return upon his investment
after modifying his building to the extent necessary to comply
with the floor area regulations .... 41
The claim that over-compliance with other planning code reg-
ulations entitled the developer to a variance from floor area ratio
regulations drew a sharp response from Justice Tobriner:
[W]e need only note that such self-imposed burdens cannot legally
justify the granting of a variance ...
Since few buildings are designed at planning code mini-
mums, variance applications based upon this open-ended theory
would soon become commonplace. The board would then be
empowered to decide which code provisions to enforce in any
39. Id. at 779 n.10, 427 P.2d at 818, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 154 (citation omitted).
Professor Lefcoe has noted, "[I]n fact, as the demand for large apartments goes un-
met and those who loaded their buildings with small units experience vacancies, de-
velopers and lenders are bound to take heed. Bedroom limits prevent their respond-
ing quickly; FAR [floor area ratio] restrictions do not. Thus it is not surprising that
while the former have received a mixed judicial reaction, the latter have been uni-
formly sustained. [Citing Broadway, Laguna]." Lefcoe, The Public Housing Refer-
endum Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1384, 1435 (1971).
40. 66 Cal. 2d at 775, 427 P.2d at 815-16, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 151-52 (emphasis
in original).
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given case; that power does not properly repose in any admin-
istrative tribunal-'
Broadway, Laguna stands as a legal bulwark against capricious
and unfounded variances. Justice Tobriner's decision, together with
other necessary elements such as effective codes, diligent administrative
personnel, and attentive community groups, thus helps to assure better
quality housing and more attractively planned communities for housing
consumers in California.
42
Landowner's Expectations vs. Legitimate Community Purposes
An inverse condemnation action alleging "taking" or "damage"
to property is sometimes a landowner's response to a zoning plan that
deprives him of his profit expectations while seeking to control de-
velopment for the general long range benefit of the community. In
two opinions, 43 Justice Tobriner indicated the latitude courts should
give municipalities in controlling development. In those cases, he
indicated that, short of arbitrary application of zoning plans, he would
accord relatively slight weight to landowners' expectations of a profit
on real estate transactions in comparison to legitimate community
purposes.
Hamer v. Town of Ross,44 one of Justice Tobriner's earliest opin-
ions as a supreme court justice, involved two related aspects of zoning
restrictions: a single family resident restriction and a minimum one-
acre lot size requirement. The court upheld the single family restric-
tion but struck down the one-acre minimum requirement. The court
found the size restriction, which had been applied to property virtually
41. Id. at 778-79, 427 P.2d at 817-18, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 153-54.
42. In Broadway, Laguna the court reviewed the administrative record to deter-
mine whether the findings were supported by sufficient evidence. In Topanga Ass'n
for a Scenic Community v. County of Los Angeles, 11 Cal. 3d 506, 522 P.2d 12, 113
Cal. Rptr. 836 (1974), the court, with Justice Tobriner writing the majority opinion,
held that a planning commission's decision to grant a variance must be supported by
findings. Justice Tobriner wrote that "[bly setting forth a reasonable requirement
for findings and clarifying the standard of judicial review, we believe we promote the
achievement of the intended scheme of land use control." Id. at 517, 522 P.2d at
19, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 842-43. In No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d
68, 529 P.2d 66, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1974), Justice Tobriner's majority opinion struck
down ordinances creating oil drilling districts because the city failed to comply with
all of the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970, CAL. PuB.
RiEsourcs CODE § 21050 et seq. (West Supp. 1956-1976).
43. Hamer v. Town of Ross, 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335
(1963); HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr.
365 (1975).
44. 59 Cal. 2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963).
surrounded by smaller parcels, to be "unreasonable, oppressive and
unwarranted" because the nonconforming uses of smaller parcels would
not be eliminated. "In reality we contemplate here an isolated area
that has become an 'island' of one-acre minimum lot size zoning in
a residential ocean of substantially less restrictive zoning."4  Thus
Hamer has been cited primarily as an example of a limitation upon
the zoning powers.4 6  Yet Justice Tobriner found that the town's
expressed desire to maintain its single family residence character was
valid, despite the plaintiff's loss of property value: "A right accorded
to plaintiff to construct multiple dwellings upon her property would
result in her foisting upon her neighbors the detriment of the loss of
a one-family dwelling area .... ,,4-
In HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court,48 the court, with Justice Tobriner
writing the majority opinion, held that down-zoning did not require
compensation for the property owner's loss. The decision represented
a hard choice between the practical viability of zoning and an appeal-
ing claim of fairness by the property owners. The plaintiffs in HFH
purchased six acres of land on an intersection in the city of Cerritos
in 1966 for $388,000, expecting to construct a shopping center for the
surrounding residential neighborhood. They conditioned the sale up-
on the subsequent successful zoning of the property as commercial,
which in fact occurred. Five years later, in 1971, with the land still
undeveloped, the city adopted a moratorium on construction and tem-
porary down-zoned the property to agricultural use. Plaintiffs, as
vendors, entered into a $400,000 sale contract the next year, condi-
tioned on reclassification to commercial use. This time, however, the
plaintiffs failed to procure better than single family residential rezon-
ing despite commercial zoning on the other three corners of the inter-
section. In the inverse condemnation action, they alleged that their
property had declined in value from $400,000 to $75,000 and sought
the difference from the city for a "taking" or "damage."
Justice Tobriner refused to depart from the principle that inverse
condemnation does not lie to challenge a zoning action effecting only
diminution of market value. After reviewing the rationale of Euclid
45. Id. at 781-82, 382 P.2d at 380, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
46. E.g., HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d at 527 n.5, 542 P.2d at 250,
125 Cal. Rptr. at 378 (Clark, J., dissenting); Berger, To Regulate, or Not to Regu-
late, 8 Loy. L. REV. 253, 283 (1975).
47. 59 Cal. 2d at 788, 382 P.2d at 383, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
48. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 904 (1976).
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v. Ambler Realty Co.,49 which upheld the constitutionality of modem
zoning, he distinguished those California cases requiring payment for
inequitable zoning taken as a prelude to public acquisition or as a
substitute for public use.50 He then squarely faced the fairness argu-
ment, explaining what he viewed as the relevant economic equities:
In this case, as in most instances, zoning is not an arbitrary action
depriving someone of property for the purpose of its use by the
public or transfer to another; rather it involves reciprocal benefits
and burdens which the circumstances of this case well illustrate.
The shopping center which plaintiffs seem at various times to have
contemplated erecting, would derive its value from the existence
of residential housing in the surrounding area. That residential
character of the neighborhood, we may assume, results in part
from the residential zoning of the area around the tract in ques-
tion. Plaintiffs in this case therefore find themselves in a some-
what uncomfortable position: they wish to reap the benefits in
the form of higher market values of their land, of the restrictive
zoning on other properties, but do not wish to bear the reciprocal
burden of such zoning when it applies to their property.51
It is arguable, however, that plaintiffs had already borne the reciprocal
burden of the surrounding residential zoning or at least had not reaped
the benefit when the purchase price they paid reflected commercial
zoning of their own property and residential zoning of the surrounding
neighborhood. In this case, Justice Tobriner added the self-fulfilling
"foreseeable gamble" argument, which did not fully deal with the
question of fairness to those who lose the gamble:
52
The long settled state of zoning law renders the possibility of
change in zoning clearly foreseeable to land speculators and other
purchasers of property, who discount their estimate of its value
by the probability of such change. The real possibility of zoning
changes for the tract in question finds ample demonstration in
plaintiffs' insistence that their grantor procure such a change be-
fore conveying the land to them. Having obtained the benefits
of such rezoning, but having failed to take advantage of it by
building, they now assert that the termination of such rezoing
rendered the city liable to damages. 53
Justice Tobriner referred to Professor Michelman's analogy of the
property buyer who presumably discounts his purchase price by the
49. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
50. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1972); Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1969); Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1963).
51. 15 Cal. 3d at 520-21, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
52. See notes 56-57 & accompanying text infra.
53. Id. at 521, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
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possible costs of down-zoning to the buyer of a sweepstakes ticket.54
Just as society refuses to refund the purchase price of the losing ticket,
so it should not compensate the property owner if down-zoning ma-
terializes. The property owner, Michelman says, got exactly what he
meant to buy and should be held to his bargain. 55
Neither the plaintiffs' nor the city's view seems to be a satisfactory
answer to the question of fairness to the property buyer. Since the
buyer is not always a "land speculator," he is unable to discount his
purchase price by the cost and probability of future down-zoning,
especially if he is unfamiliar with the local political climate or if his
participation in the zoning "sweepstakes" is involuntary. Justice To-
briner recognized those problems related to fairness in HFH when he
explained that the court's refusal to depart from the principle of no
compensation for diminution of market value owing to zoning action
reflects less our belief that no problems exist with the present law
in this area than our conviction that legislative rather than ju-
dicial action holds the key to any useful reform. The welter
of proposals for action to remedy the inequities in the scheme
of land use regulation which fall short of invoking constitutional
protection bear ample witness to the ferment in this area.5 6
In so stating, Justice Tobriner did not retreat from his views concerning
the capabilities of courts to fashion new rules to meet new social and
economic realities. He merely recognized that the solution requires
a complex scheme more appropriate for legislative than judicial ac-
tion.57  Such a scheme should, for example, define and measure the
types and amounts of diminution of property values to become com-
pensable and the types of governmental zoning actions that would
permit compensation. If the scheme looked to "windfall" beneficiaries
of governmental action as a revenue source, it would have to make
similar definitions and measurements.
"No Growth" Zoning
Another very recent case presented the issue of the constitution-
54. Id. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REV. 1165, 1238 (1967).
55. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 H~Av. L. REv. 1165, 1238 (1967).
56. 15 Cal. 3d at 521-22, 542 P.2d at 246-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75.
57. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Contractor Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205,
529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974) appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976),
wherein Justice Tobriner, writing the majority opinion held that a zoning ordinance
can be enacted by the initiative process. He said that the zoning ordinance in this
case was a general legislative act to which due process requirements of notice and
hearing did not apply. Id.
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ality of zoning restrictions in an unusual and challenging manner.
Under attack was an initiative ordinance adopted by the voters of
Livermore that prohibited issuance of any building permits until local
educational, sewage, and water supply services met specified stand-
ards. Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City
of Livermore58 touched on the conflicting constitutional and social
policy values that have marked recent cases involving restrictive zon-
ing: the police power to plan for orderly growth; the right to privacy
and freedom of association; the right to travel and settle; equal pro-
tection and freedom from racial and wealth discrimination; environ-
mental values of open space, clean air, and quietude; and human values
involving employment, adequate housing and equal opportunity.
Writing for a majority of the court, Justice Tobriner reversed the
trial court's holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional and re-
manded the case for full litigation of the relevant constitutional issues.5 9
Justice Tobriner stated that the appropriate constitutional standard
was the "reasonable relationship" test, that it should be based on re-
gional, not local, welfare but that the limited record available on appeal
precluded a constitutional judgment.60 He indicated that for purposes
of constitutional scrutiny the court should analogize the Livermore
ordinance, a temporary measure that would expire when specific public
services standards were met, to other zoning laws whose effect was
to limit growth.61 He was similarly untroubled by the claim that the
standards ina the initiative were void for vagueness, construing them
as making the appropriate specific references to other standards so as
to preserve their constitutionality.6 2  Moreover, based on the limited
58. 18 Cal. 3d 582, 557 P.2d 475, 135 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1976).,
59. 18 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 557 P.2d at 489-90, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57-58. Justices
Clark and Mosk filed very separate dissents. Id. at 611, 616, 557 P.2d at 490, 493,
135 Cal. Rptr. at 58, 61. Justice Clark found the ordinance unconstitutional because
he believed the initiative process conflicted with the hearing requirement in state
zoning law. Id. at 613, 557 P.2d at 491, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 59. Justice Mosk found
the ordinance to be in violation of Sections 1 and 7 of Article I of the California Con-
stitution as a total exclusion of people from a community. Id. at 623, 557 P.2d at
497, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 65.
60. Id. at 607-08, 557 P.2d at 487, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 55.
61. In Builders Ass'n v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 225, 529 P.2d 582, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 158 (1974), appeal dismissed, 427 U.S. 901 (1976), Justice Tobriner wrote the
majority opinion which upheld a zoning ordinance which precluded rezoning of land
for residential use for a two year period unless school districts in which the subject
land was situated certified that the party seeking rezoning had agreed to provide a
satisfactory alternative to permanent school construction.
62. Id. at 596, 557 P.2d at 481, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 49. It should be noted that
the plaintiffs in Livermore failed to claim that the Livermore ordinance discriminated
on the basis of race or wealth.
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record before the court, Justice Tobriner declined to agree that the
ordinance had the effect of absolutely prohibiting or limiting popula-
tion growth.63  Finally, he disposed of the plaintiff's claim that the
initiative was an improper procedure for adopting a zoning ordinance
by viewing the state zoning law's procedural requirements for hear-
ings as applicable only to city council actions and not to the people's
constitutional power to act by initiative.
6 4
By way of guidance to the trial court, Justice Tobriner outlined
the steps necessary for a determination of the validity of a challenged
restriction.65 First, the court should attempt to forecast the probable
effect and duration of the restriction. This analysis may be aided by
consideration of the current adequacy of public facilities, the steps that
local governmental entities have undertaken in constructing needed
improvements, and the schedule for completion of such improvements.
Second, the court should identify the competing interests that are
affected by the challenged restriction. 66  Third, the court must de-
termine if the ordinance represents a fair accommodation of these
competing interests.
With the interplay of so many delicate and important constitu-
tional and social policies, Justice Tobriner obviously took the cautious
path by requiring a fully litigated record. Plainly, the competing
values include many to which he is particularly sensitive. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether it was possible at such a threshold stage
to determine the appropriate constitutional standard of scrutiny. The
adoption of the liberal standard of reasonable relationship might have
more appropriately awaited a subsequent determination of whether
Livermore's prohibition on building permits was likely to be of short
duration, whether the city was rapidly constructing the public fa-
cilities necessary to provide service to more people, and whether no
shortage of housing opportunity existed in the immediate surrounding
region. If as Mosk assumed in his concurring opinion, however, the
litigation subsequently disclosed a more permanent ban on new con-
struction which foreclosed regional housing opportunities and thus
immigration, then it might have been necessary to apply the strict
scrutiny test associated with substantial infringement of fundamental
constitutional rights, including the right to travel and settle.
63. Id. at 600, 557 P.2d at 483, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
64. Id. at 590, 557 P.2d at 476, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
65. Id. at 600, 557 P.2d at 485, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
66. The court notes, for example, the antagonism between environmentalists and
egalitarian humanists, conservative suburban residents and those desiring to immigrate.
id. at 600, 557 P.2d at 485, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 57.
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Incorporation- The Resident's Right to Participate
Just as Justice Tobriner values land use planning as a method of
serving interests of the whole community, so he held that the voting
community in an incorporation case includes all residents, not merely
property owners. In Curtis v. Board of Supervisors," Justice To-
briner wrote the majority opinion in which the court held unconsti-
tutional a statute that allocated the power to determine whether an
area should be incorporated to landowners, based on the assessed
value of their land. Despite the fact that 64 percent of the landowners
in Rancho Palos Verdes requested incorporation, an ordinance pre-
cluded the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors from calling an
incorporation election because persons owning a controlling interest
of the assessed valuation of the land had filed protests opposing the
incorporation. The court held that the law violated the equal protec-
tion clauses of the fourteenth amendment and of the California Con-
stitution because it permitted the owners of a majority of the assessed
valuation of land to thwart the desires of a majority of landowners and
to preclude nonlandowning voters registered in the area from voting
on the issue. Because fundamental voting rights were involved, the
court applied the compelling state interest test in determining the
constitutional invalidity of the provision in question.
Countering the Jeffersonian arguments that landowners had a
greater stake in government, Justice Tobriner wrote that
all residents share a substantial interest in the government of their
state, city, county school district, and other agencies of general
governmental power, and the issuance of bonds by these entities.
Consequently the special concern of the landowners as to the
level of taxes upon real property cannot justify exclusion of the
nonlandowner nor the proportionate reduction of the vote of
owners of less valuable property. 8
The effect of the statute was to grant disproportionate power to devel-
opers and owners of large land tracts at the expense of residents and
businessmen who owned small developed parcels.69 Justice Tobriner
concluded that this discrimination served no legitimate governmental
purpose because "it is the residents of a region, not the non-resident
landowners, who as a class are the more deeply concerned with its
government."70
67. 7 Cal. 3d 942, 501 P.2d 537, 104 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1972).
68. Id. at 960, 501 P.2d at 549, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 309.
69. Id. at 963, 501 P.2d at 551-52, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311-12.
70. Id. at 962, 501 P.2d at 551, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 311.
Justice Tobriner rejected the argument that the statutory plan
merely conditioned incorporation on concurrent approval by two in-
terested groups, landowners and residents who vote in the incorpora-
tion election. He distinguished cases upholding voting systems based
on the assessed value of land for special districts "whose design, powers
and methods of financing are more closely related to ownership of
land."'71 Thus, a California court later held that a statute permitting
only registered voters residing in an area to vote at a county service
area election is not constitutionally invalid.72 Nevertheless, some com-
mentators have suggested that Justice Tobriner's decision in Curtis
may call into question the validity of a variety of statutes concerning
incorporation and annexation.
7 3
Financing Real Property- Consumer's Rights
Courts generally apply the concepts of unequal bargaining power
and the reasonable expectation of consumers to the areas of insurance
and consumer products. Yet Justice Tobriner has applied adhesion
contract principles to real estate transactions as well.
In Tahoe National Bank v. Phillips,7 4 plaintiff bank loaned the
defendant money for a real estate venture. Defendant executed a
promissory note and, as security, an instrument assigning to the bank
all rent due from the property described in the instrument and promis-
ing not to convey or encumber the property. The property described
was not that involved in the venture but rather defendant's residence,
which was then unencumbered. Thereafter, defendant recorded a
homestead declaration on her residence. The supreme court held that
the instrument was not a mortgage and thus did not take priority over
the homestead declaration.
Justice Tobriner, in the majority opinion, found that the instru-
ment on its face could not be construed as a mortgage. He thus held
evidence that plaintiff sought to introduce to show that the parties
intended to execute a mortgage to be inadmissible under the parol
71. Id. at 960, 501 P.2d at 549, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 309. See Salyer Land Co. v.
Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973); Schindler v. Palo Verde
Irrigation Dist., 1 Cal. App. 3d 831, 82 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1969).
72. E.g., Erven v. Board of Supervisors, 53 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 126 Cal. Rptr.
285 (1975).
73. See Levinsohn v. City of San Rafael, 40 Cal. App. 3d 656, 115 Cal. Rptr. 309
(1974). Note, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 240 (1973). Compare Weber v. City Council,
9 Cal. 3d 950, 513 P.2d 601, 109 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1973) with Tillie Lewis Foods, Inc.
v. City of Pittsburg, 52 Cal. App. 3d 983, 124 Cal. Rptr. 698 (1975).
74. 4 Cal. 3d 11, 480 P.2d 320, 92 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1971).
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evidence rule.7 5 He then labeled the agreement a contract of adhe-
sion and utilized that characterization to construe it against the bank
as the drafter.
70
Justice Tobriner contended that to allow a creditor to use an
ambiguous agreement and then permit it to utilize extrinsic evidence
to support its interpretation of the agreement would create the danger
of overreaching on the part of creditors in superior bargaining positions
and would depart from the rules that have evolved with respect to the
interpretation of adhesion contracts.77 The significance of this appli-
cation of adhesion contract principles in a real property setting is borne
out by later cases that distinguish Tahoe National Bank on the basis
that the Tahoe bank was an experienced lending institution as con-
trasted with a private creditor.78 Thus, as in insurance policy cases,
Justice Tobriner used the adhesion contract theory in part to construe
an ambiguity against the drafter. In the traditional adhesion contract
cases, courts recognize that one of the parties has little effective bar-
gaining power and may not comprehend the significance of ambiguous
language. As a result of Tahoe National Bank and other cases, one
commentator has noted:
The lender who uses these ambiguous clauses because ...he
prefers to determine his status at the time of default will probably
find that he has succeeded only in leaving determination of his
status to the debtor. In the typical case when the lender claims
that the note is secured by the deed of trust, the debtor has a
good chance of persuading the court that the debt is actually
unsecured79
In connection with the financing of real estate, especially homes,
75. Id. at 23, 480 P.2d at 330, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 714.
76. Id. at 20, 480 P.2d at 327, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 711. See McCall, Due Process
and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure and Substance - Re-
possession and Adhesion Contract Issues,. 26 HATsNGS L.J. 383, 417 n.159 (1974).
77. Id. As the dissent points out, the court had some difficulty distinguishing
Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964),
in which the court affirmed a judgment of foreclosure upon a covenant virtually iden-
tical to the one in the Tahoe Bank case. See also Reichman, The Anti-Lien: Another
Security Interest in Land, U. Cm. L. REv. 685, 698-701 (1974).
78. Kaiser Indus. Corp. v. Taylor, 17 Cal. App. 3d 346, 351-52, 94 Cal. Rptr.
773, 775 (1971). See also Carroll v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 62 Cal. App. 3d 885,
901, 133 Cal. Rptr. 461, 470 (1976); Powell v. Central Cal. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
59 Cal. App. 3d 540, 551, 130 Cal. Rptr. 635, 641 (1976); Abrams v. Crocker-Citizens
Nat'l Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 60, 114 Cal. Rptr. 913, 915 (1974); Reichman, The
Anti-Lien: Another Security Interest in Land, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 685, 698 (1974);
California Supreme Court, 60 CALrF. L. REv. 759, 970-71 (1972).
79. Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries
Again, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 753, 814 (1975).
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Justice Tobriner has utilized the doctrine prohibiting restraints on
alienation to protect landowners against overreaching by lending in-
stitutions. Yet, by relaxing the doctrine and employing a concept
of reasonableness, Justice Tobriner has recognized that lenders have
a legitimate interest in protecting the property that secures the loan.
8 0
In La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association,8' plaintiffs
brought a class action against defendant savings and loan association,
alleging that a "due-on-encumbrance" clause constituted an invalid
restraint upon alienation. That clause was a provision in the de-
fendant's form of trust deed permitting the lender to accelerate the
outstanding balance of the loan if the borrower executed a junior
encumbrance in the secured property.
After dealing with a variety of procedural issues,12 the court, with
Justice Tobriner writing the majority opinion, held that a due-on-
encumbrance clause would be valid only if its enforcement was rea-
sonably necessary to protect the lender's security. Such necessity
would exist, according to the court, if the subsequent financing trans-
action resembled a sale or when the borrower would no longer have
any incentive to maintain the property. 3  He also noted that it was
the lender's application of the clause, and not the clause itself that
rendered the restraint invalid.
8 4
The court pointed out that cases upholding the validity of due-
on-sale clauses8 5 did so because it was reasonable that the creditor
be able to protect his interest by requiring the borrower to maintain
an interest in the property. With regard to a junior encumbrance,
generally the borrower retains this interest and thus retains his in-
centive to maintain the property. Justice Tobriner indicated that to
validate a due-on-encumbrance clause in every case, however, would
be to give to the lender the power to exact additional consideration as
a condition to permitting a borrower to execute a junior encumbrance. 86
80. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97
Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
81. Id.
82. Of some significance is the indication in the opinion that suits involving ad-
hesion contracts might be appropriate for class actions since they often involve stand-
ard contracts and common questions of interpretation. Id. at 876-77, 489 P.2d at
1120-21, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 856-57.
83. Id. at 879, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
84. Id. at 882, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
85. E.g., Coast Bank v. Minderhout, 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr.
505 (1964).
86. 5 Cal. 3d at 880 n.17, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
September 1977] JUSTICE TOBRINER AND REAL PROPERTY
Thereafter, in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,87 the
California Supreme Court held that a due-on-sale clause in an install-
ment land contract was not enforceable by acceleration because there
was no showing that the security would be impaired or that primary
recourse to the borrowers for payment of their note was jeopardized.
In that case, the court noted that Justice Tobriner's dictum in La Sala,
to the extent that it validated due-on-sale clauses, had been the sub-
ject of critical commentary.88  The court in Tucker stated that fur-
ther consideration of that dictum "must await a case involving the
attempted exercise of a 'due-on' clause upon outright sale by the
trustor."
8 9
Perpetuities and Hereditiments - Old Doctrines and Expectations
Justice Tobriner has dealt with other traditional real property
concepts. Even though these concepts do not involve competing eco-
nomic interests or land use planning, he nevertheless has analyzed the
issues from the standpoint of public policy.
Gerhard v. Stephens9" contains one of his most exhaustive dis-
cussions of classical real property doctrine. In that case, the court
held that drilling rights for oil and gas constitute a profit a prendre,
which is an incorporeal hereditiment, and as such can be abandoned.
In his majority opinion, Justice Tobriner pointed to considerations of
public policy by contending that "a ruling that incorporeal herediti-
ments of the type involved here may be abandoned tends to promote
the marketability of title by facilitating the clearing of titles."91  This
result, he noted, "better fulfills the demands of modem economic
order."92 He also pointed out that the policy against voids or gaps
in the chain of title to real property is not applicable to drilling rights,
which upon abandonment revert to the owner of the surface or servient
87. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
88. Id. at 634-35 n.7, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636. See Bonanno,
Due on Sale and Prepayment Clauses in Real Estate Financing in California in Times
of Fluctuating Interest Rates - Legal Issues and Alternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REv. 267,
282 (1972); Comment, Applying the Brakes to Acceleration Clauses: Controlling Their
Misuse in Real Property Secured Transaction, 9 CAL. W.L. REv. 514 (1973).
89. 12 Cal. 3d at 634-35 n.7, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636. See also
Mendouoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 62 Cal. App. 3d 317, 330-31, 133 Cal.
Rptr. 63, 72; Leipziger, The Mortgagee's Remedies For Waste, 64 CALw. L. REV. 1086,
1112-18 (1976).
90. 68 Cal. 2d 864, 442 P.2d 692, 69 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1968).
91. Id. at 888-89, 442 P.2d at 712, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 632.
92. Id.
estate. 3  Justice Tobriner sought, however, to protect people against
the loss of rights contrary to their desires by declaring that a court can
decree an abandonment only if there is a non-user and the owner's
conduct clearly and convincingly demonstrates his intent to abandon.
9 4
In Wong v. Di Grazia,9 5 Justice Tobriner wrote a scholarly ma-
jority opinion concerning the rule against perpetuities. In Wong, the
defendant lessors executed a written agreement providing for the
commencement of a lease "upon completion" of a business structure,
construction of which was to begin "forthwith" upon approval of com-
pleted plans and to "continue expeditiously" until completion." Plain-
tiffs sought to rescind the agreement, and defendants cross-complained
for a breach of the agreement. Plaintiffs asserted, inter alia, that the
agreement was invalid on the ground that it violated the rule against
perpetuities because commencement of its term was subject to con-
tingencies that could postpone its "vesting" more than twenty-one
years after its execution. The court held that because the circum-
stances of the transaction demonstrated that the building was to be
completed within a reasonable time, which reasonable time was less
than twenty-one years, the agreement did not violate the rule against
perpetuities 7
Justice Tobriner stated, "Since the rule against perpetuities was
born in a society which extolled the tight ownership of inherited real
property, it does not facilely operate as to commercial agreements in
today's dynamic economy."98  Because, as Justice Tobriner noted,
it is a common business arrangement to have a lease that commences
upon building completion, few would suspect that such agreements
could be invalidated by the rule. 9  He wrote, "Surely the courts do
not seek to invalidate bona fide transactions by the imported applica-
tion of esoteric legalisms. Our task is not to block the business path-
93. Id. at 887, 442 P.2d at 711, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 631. The court also discussed
a variety of other contentions including those relating to adverse possession and quiet
title actions.
94. Id. at 890, 442 P.2d at 713-14, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 633-34. See also, Faus v.
City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 350, 431 P.2d 849, 62 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1967), in which
the court, with Justice Tobriner writing the unanimous opinion, held, inter alia, that
the city's use of certain parcels of land for business use did not conflict with deeds
granting easements for electric railway service. Id.
95. 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
96. Id. at 528-29, 386 P.2d at 819-20, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 243-44.
97. Id. at 541, 386 P.2d at 829, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 252.
98. Id. at 533, 386 P.2d at 823, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
99. Id.
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way but to clear it, defining it by guideposts that are reasonably to
be expected."10o
Rather than abolish the rule or adjust the term "vest" by labeling
the transaction as a presently vested interest, Justice Tobriner utilized
contract principles to conclude "that all rights established by the agree-
ment arise within the 21 year period [so that] the interest . - . does
not vest or fail later than 21 years after its creation . . . . "01 Ac-
cordingly, in Wong, he adopted a reasonable approach to the appli-
cation of a longstanding rule so as to accommodate the expectations
of those involved with commercial real estate.
Conclusion
In his decisions in housing, zoning, and other real property cases,
Justice Tobriner demonstrates his intellect, his sense of fairness, and
his awareness of modem economic. realities. Most of the issues in
the cases discussed in this article present neither obvious policy
choices nor clear results. It is a tribute to Justice Tobriner's per-
suasiveness and creativity in borrowing concepts from other fields that
so many of his decisions in these cases appear logically compelling.
His better known contributions to the law may be in areas other than
real property, but his application of the policies that unify his ap-
proaches to law has made an important contribution to the field of
real property as well.
100. Id. at 534, 386 P.2d at 823, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 247.
101. Id. at 541, 386 P.2d at 828, 35 Cal. Rptr. at 252.

